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Regulatory capital: Implications on credit 
creation and profitability
Isaiah Oino1*
Abstract:  The level of liquidity in banking determines the extent to which a bank can 
meet its financial intermediation role. Liquidity and regulatory capital requirements 
have gained momentum after the 2008 global financial crisis. Meeting the share-
holder’s need (i.e profitability) and regulatory requirements (liquidity and capital) is 
a delicate balance that banks strive to achieve. Applying a pooled fixed-effects model 
on a complete panel of 179 banks from 2008 to 2019 in the European Union, the 
results show how banks in Europe strive to achieve profitability requirements at the 
same time meeting the regulatory hurdles. The results indicate, better-capitalised 
banks lend much more, which in turn enhances profitability. Also, the findings indicate 
that higher capital requirements for banks significantly positively influence liquidity. 
Furthermore, there is an inverse relationship between growth in loans and total 
regulatory capital. The results imply banks should ensure that the quality of the capital 
base and the buffers above the regulatory minimum are built up during periods of 
strong earnings growth. The results also indicate that profitability is significant in 
influencing the liquidity of the bank. The results emphasise the need to regulate not 
only the minimum capital requirement but also the liquidity level.
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liquidity. The results imply banks should ensure 
that the quality of the capital base and the buf-
fers above the regulatory minimum are built up 
during periods of strong earnings growth.
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1. Introduction
Banking is one of the most important sectors in the economy because of the intermediation role that 
banks play. To perform such a role effectively, apart from being efficient, it is paramount that the 
banks are liquid enough to meet the financial commitments. According to the Basel Committee, one 
of the main objectives of recent financial reforms to strengthen global capital and liquidity rules is to 
build a foundation for sustainable economic growth with a strong and resilient banking system (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011). In line with this, several pieces of research have examined 
the effects of financial shocks on real economic activity and the procyclical nature of risk-based 
capital ratios Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012), Lopez-Salido et al. (2015), Gertler and Karadi (2015), and 
Caldara and Herbst (2016). The relationship between capital levels and credit supply has been 
identified by Berrospide and Edge (2010) as one of the most fundamental research issues that require 
resolution in verifying the link between the financial sector and real activity. Also, Gambacorta and 
Paolo Emilio Mistrulli (2004), and Meh (2011) emphasise the importance of the bank-capital channel, 
through which monetary policy and shocks to bank capital affect bank lending.
Liquidity may be impacted as a result of sudden, unexpected cash outflows by way of large 
deposit withdrawals, large credit disbursements, unexpected market movements, or crystallisation 
of contingent obligations. The other cause may be because of some other events causing counter-
parties to avoid trading with or lending to the bank. A number of studies have emphasised the 
importance of banks’ liquidity as well as its effects on the banks. For example, DeYoung and Jang 
(2016) stated that the Basel III standard is tantamount to the Tirole (2011) analysis for bank 
liquidity that centres on three main areas: maintaining liquid assets to aid short-term financing 
runs; issuing stable deposits that may not run; and holding significant levels of equity financing to 
indicate long-term solvency and thus minimise the possibility of runs.
Considering banks differ significantly from non-financial firms by the fact that the bulk of the 
bank’s liabilities are subject to payment on call, it is paramount that at all times the resources of 
the bank provide the means for meeting demands for cash as they are made. It might appear that 
this would require banks to hold against these liabilities resources, which are also payable on call.
Apart from the demand deposit and its effects on liquidity, many studies have examined the 
effect of changes in bank capital on lending (Berrospide & Edge, 2010; Brei et al., 2013; Carlson 
et al., 2011). Conversely, some scholars focus on other factors that have slowed down bank lending 
during the recent financial crisis. For example, Cornett et al. (2011) highlight the negative effect of 
bank liquidity on lending during the recent crisis.
The overarching objective of this paper is to assess host factors that may influence liquidity in 
the selected banking sector using a host of estimation methods to draw a comparison. The article 
also analyses how the regulatory capital not only influences liquidity but also how it impacts the 
profitability of the banks. Also, the procyclical nature of regulatory capital is assessed in the 
context of 179 banks in the European Union economies. This study extends the debate on the 
Dodd–Frank Act of 2010 and Basel’s capital requirements on liquidity creation and bank profit-
ability and a recent study by Tran et al. (2016) that examined the inter-relationships between 
liquidity creation, regulatory capital and profitability using US banks from 1996 to 2013. Higher 
capital requirements may drive up funding costs and reduce liquidity creation, which would lead to 
lower lending and investment activities in the economy. Banks are therefore likely to experience 
lower profitability since a higher capital requirement shifts funding from liquid deposits to less 
liquid capital. For example, Goddard et al. (2010) argue that an increase in capital requirements 
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has a negative impact on bank profitability. Also, Andreou et al. (2016) point out that during the 
financial crisis, banks are likely to reduce liquidity creation and hence reduced profitability.
Conversely, Admati et al. (2013) noted that higher capital requirements tend to reduce excessive 
risk-taking activities. Consequently, banks tend to perform better due to fewer distortions in 
lending decisions and lower moral hazards. Other studies have indicated a positive association 
between higher capital requirements and performance (Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, 2000; Iannotta 
et al., 2007; Lee & Hsieh, 2013).
This study also contributes to the current literature, which focuses on the effect of either capital 
or liquidity creation on bank profitability without considering both effects together. For instance, A. 
N. Berger and Bouwman (2009) assessed the impact of capital on liquidity creation and the 
association between liquidity creation and bank value separately. This study examines the effect 
of liquidity creation when regulatory capital changes.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study that investigates the dynamic interrelation-
ships among liquidity creation, regulatory capital, and bank performance using banks in Europe. 
This paper builds upon studies on the effect of regulations on bank soundness (Barth et al., 2004; 
Delis & Staikouras, 2011) and Tran et al. (2016) nexus between regulatory capital, liquidity and 
profitability among the US banks.
The results also show that banks do not strengthen their regulatory capital buffer when they 
face higher illiquidity as defined in the Basel III accords or when they create more liquidity. The 
results support the need to implement minimum liquidity ratios as recommended by the Basel 
Committee. Therefore, the results provide insights into the design of prudential regulation and 
supervision of banks. That is, regulatory capital interventions do have a positive consequence of 
liquidity creation that is paramount to a well-functioning banking system. In terms of contribu-
tion to the literature, this paper points out that there is a significant interaction effect of bank 
capital and liquidity on credit supply. That is an increasing regulatory capital significantly posi-
tively influences liquidity ratios. In terms of policy implications, the results point out that policy 
actions such as revised minimum capital requirements and liquidity requirements such as liquid-
ity coverage ratio (LCR) ensure sustainable lending and the two should be harmoniously 
implemented.
2. Related studies
Managing liquidity in banking is one of the most important elements that bank supervisors or 
regulators keep a close eye on.
A bank should maintain sufficient liquidity to withstand all kinds of stress events that it will be 
faced. Constant assessment of liquidity risk management framework and liquidity position is an 
important supervisory action that will ensure the proper functioning of the bank. Literature on the 
determinants of liquidity risk relatively scarce. However, liquidity risk is mainly considered as 
a determinant of other risks, such as credit risk (Bissoondoyal-Bheenick & Treepongkaruna, 
2011) or influence of bank financial performance (Arif & Anees, 2012; Pasiouras & Kosmidou, 
2007). In terms of determinants of liquidity risk, Rauch, Steffen, Hackethal, & Tyrrel (2010) high-
light that the most important determinants are macroeconomic variables and monetary policies. 
Also, Bunda and Desquilbet (2008), in their study on 1107 commercial banks in 36 emerging 
economies and noted that capitalisation has a significant and positive relationship with all 
liquidity measures considered in their study and a significant relationship with the inflation rate 
and growth rate.
Similarly, A.N. Berger and Bouwman (2009) noted that banks with a lower level of equity capital 
are more likely to commit to monitoring their borrowers and hence allow them to grant loans and 
to create more liquidity. That is, a higher level of capital increases liquidity creation because 
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a higher level of capital improves an institution’s ability to absorb and diversify risk and hence 
creates more liquidity. Pana et al. (2011) also find the positive relationship between capital and 
liquidity creation for large banks, but find no evidence for small banks. However, Mukherjee and 
Pana (2010) report the negative relationship between capital and liquidity creation for credit 
unions. Other studies have noted that different levels of liquidity can be created by changing the 
funding mix on the liabilities (Diamond & Rajan, 2001; Gorton & Winton, 2000), and the amount of 
equity capital impacts the level of lending and the asset portfolio composition, and thus affects 
liquidity transformation (Thakor, 1996).
In analysing the impact of liquidity, Kumbirai and Webb (2010) investigated the relationship 
between the liquidity, profitability, and credit quality performance of South Africa’s commercial 
banks for the period of 2005–2009. The study concluded that the global financial crisis had an adverse 
effect on South African banks, which had resulted in falling profitability, low liquidity, and deteriorating 
credit quality of the banking sector. Also, Bordelean and Graham (2010) analysed the association 
between liquidity and profitability for a panel of Canadian and U.S. banks from 1997 to 2009. Their 
study indicated that there is a non-linear relationship between liquid assets and profitability. However, 
Molyneux and Thorton (1992) and Goddard et al. (2010) document a negative effect of liquidity on 
bank performance across European countries for the periods of 1986–1989 and the mid-1990s, 
respectively. Interesting results were noted also by Altunbas et al. (2007) that inefficient European 
banks appear to be highly capitalized banks. Goddard et al. (2010) find that well-capitalised banks 
appear to have lower profitability in eight European Union member countries from 1992 to 2007.
Other studies have analysed the impact of macroeconomic variables on liquidity. Regarding GDP, 
Valla et al. (2006) noted that appetite for higher creation of liquidity increases with better 
economic conditions than at a time of economic downturn. Also, Cucinelli (2013) noted similar 
results that liquidity is increased during the economic boom. Conversely, Aspachs et al. (2005), 
Vodová (2011a), and Moussa (2015) document higher liquidity holdings in a period of economic 
downturn, when holding is motivated by the principle of precaution from banks, but also by less 
demand for loans from clients. This demonstrates a lack of consensus in terms of the impact of 
economic growth on banking liquidity.
There are also studies that analysed the impact of bank liquidity on credit growth (Ivashina and 
Scharfstein, 2010; Berrospide, 2013; Cornett et al., 2011). Cornett et al. (2011) concluded that there 
is a negative association between an increase in liquidity and credit growth.
Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) and Berrospide (2013) noted that during the financial crisis of 
2007–08, US banks were holding more liquid assets during the 2007/08 financial crisis. This is 
because the banks were anticipating to make significant losses in loans/advances.
Therefore, the hypothesis of this study includes: 
H1. There is a positive association between liquidity and profitability.
H2. There is a positive association between profitability and regulatory capital.
H3. There is a negative association between regulatory capital and liquidity.
3. Data and methodology
For bank-level data, this research makes use of the Fitch connect database to extract unconsoli-
dated statements of financial position and income statements data, for a panel of banks within 
eight biggest economies in the European Union area. Only retail and consumer banks with 
complete data and rated A and above were included. Table A1 shows the countries from which 
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the data was extracted for the 179 private banks. We excluded government-controlled banks and 
concentrated on privately owned banks. Our population covers only European area only because 
uniformity of regulation. In considering foreign-owned banks, because they operate within the 
European Union, there will be no difference with domestic banks because the regulations do not 
discriminate the two categories. Annual data was used from 2008 to 2019. Country-specific data, 
i.e., real gross domestic product growth was extracted from the World Bank database.
The capital requirement regulation (CRR) was implemented across Europe in January 2014. This 
was because of stringent reforms post the recent global financial crisis. Such reform may bring 
structural break in the data. Structural break test was imposed on the data to assess whether 
there is a need to split the data into two. That is 2008–2013 and 2014–2019. To test for the known 
point, Chow test was used and for unknown point, recursive regressive. Both tests indicated that 
there were no significant breaks that can warrant splitting the data.
To test the relationship between the bank liquidity and the bank-specific factors and macro-
economic determinants, I used the econometric model used by Brei et al. (2013) with some 




βxjit  1 þ ∑
M
M¼1
BxMt  1 þ εits 
where εits ¼ νi þ μits
Following the literature (e.g., Berrospide & Edge, 2010; Brei et al., 2013; Gambacorta & Paolo 
Emilio Mistrulli, 2004), we use the growth rate of the dependent variable (Liq) instead of the 








βXMt  1is the country’s macroeconomic variable. In estimating the regression, a number of 
methods have been proposed, with some known to produce biased estimators. For example, 
Montgomery and Peck (1992) noted that stepwise regression tends to produce unsatisfactory 
results. Roodman (2006), recommends fixed-effects estimators as better alternatives to GMM 
under a large time dimension because under such a condition, dynamic panel bias becomes 
nonsignificant and number of instruments tends to considerably increase as time dimension 
increases. Judson and Owen (1999) also noted that fixed-effects estimators perform well or better 
when the time dimension of panel data is greater than 30. Judson and Owen (1999) also argue 
that fixed-effects estimators may be chosen even when the time dimension is 20 for balanced 
panel data. The fixed-effects method has been extensively used in the literature (for example, 
Berrospide & Edge, 2010; Cornett et al., 2011; Francis & Osborne, 2009).
Before running a regression, I assess the stationarity of the variables in the model, using panel 
unit root test, which is applicable to balanced panel data (Fisher-type tests based on augmented 
Dickey–Fuller). Stationarity means that the mean, variance and autocorrelation of a variable do not 
change with time. The results indicate that all the variables are stationary. However, some outliers 
were identified because of the timeframe that was considered in this research. Without data 
cleaning to remove or smooth off the outliers, the Robust regression method was used. Robust 
regression methods are designed to be not overly affected by violations of assumptions by the 
underlying data-generating process.
Assessing the drivers of bank liquidity could be affected by an endogenous character of certain 
variables. For instance, the more profitable a bank is, the more likely it is to increase its equity 
capital. This problem of causality could even move in the opposite direction; for example, higher 
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bank profitability could lead to more employees and less efficiency (García-Herrero et al., 2009). In 
addition, some characteristics of banks that affect their liquidity are difficult to measure or identify 
in an equation (the so-called unobserved heterogeneity); if the influence of such characteristics is 
not taken into account, there could be correlations between some of the coefficients of the 
explanatory variables and the error terms that bias these coefficients.
The dependent variable liquidity is as described in Kashyap and Stein (2000). Liquid assets are 
composed of cash, reverse Repos, bills and commercial papers and comprise in addition to all 
types of investment securities, such as equities and bonds. This research measure liquidity as 
a ratio of liquid assets to total assets. This measure is interesting since it informs on the split 
between liquid and illiquid assets (such as loans) on the bank’s balance sheet.
The liquidity estimation model was captured using Robust least square, random effects and 
pooled fixed effects (FE) after testing for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation using the 
Breusch Pagan with White test procedure as a possible remedy. The Akaike information criterion 
for FE is smaller than any other estimation method. Therefore, the FE is a better estimator. Using 
the Hausman test between the fixed effects and the random effects, the result indicates that the 
fixed effects is more appropriate, implying that the differences between the banks do not vary 
greatly from period to period. However, the results from the three estimation methods are 
reported for meaningful comparison.
All bank-specific variables and macroeconomic control variables are lagged one period to mitigate 
possible endogeneity bias. This method, though it partially alleviates the simultaneity issue, does not 
correct bias due to omitted variables. To deal with the issue of omitted/unobserved variables, we 
follow Graham et al. (2010) and Coles and Li (2013) and use fixed-effects model. The 
unobservable year effects (μt), and potentially captures temporal aggregate shocks from various 
market forces that affect both the liquidity and bank profitability. The fixed-effects model extracts 
these unobservable bank-specific characteristics from the error term, making the error term uncor-
related or less correlated with the liquidity, and providing an unbiased or less biased estimate Table 1.
4. Analysis of the results
Table 2 indicates that on average the ratio between equity and total assets is 12.3 while that maximum 
is 164.00 and the minimum 0.01 with a huge standard deviation. This ratio represents the amount of 
debt and equity used to finance the bank assets. This is an important ratio as it indicates the potential 
financial risk. A relatively high ratio, i.e., 2 commonly indicates an aggressive growth strategy by a firm. 
However, one would expect that with the banks this ratio is quite high compared with non-financial 
institutions because of the nature of the business that makes use of deposits. In terms of profitability, 
the results indicate ROE is 2.9% on average while the maximum is 31.1% and the minimum is 
−151.82%. Interestingly, as shown in Table 3, there is a positive association between profitability and 
regulatory capital requirements. This confirms Berger (1995)’s study on U.S. commercial banks where 
he found a positive relationship between the level of capital and earnings in banks. Also, Goddard et al. 
(2010) found that the relationship between the capital–asset ratio and profitability is positive for banks 
in the Euro-area. Well-capitalised banks face lower bankruptcy costs, which reduces the cost of 
funding, thereby increasing the profitability and hence fail to reject hypothesis 2. Focusing on tradi-
tional intermediation role as loans and deposits, the average share of total loans to total deposit in 
total assets is 95.22%. As expected, there is a positive association between loans to deposit and ROE.
In terms of bank liquidity, the liquid assets-to-total assets ratio was employed. This ratio measures 
the maturity structure of the asset portfolio that can reflect excessive maturity unbalances (Cihak & 
Poghosyan, 2009). The higher is the ratio, the more liquid an institution is considered. As shown in 
Table 2, on average 18.1% of the total assets were classified as those that can be converted to cash 
quickly if needed to meet financial obligations; examples of liquid assets generally include cash, 
central bank reserves, and government debt. To remain viable, a financial institution must have 
enough liquid assets to meet its near-term obligations, such as withdrawals by depositors.Table 3 
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indicates that there is multicollinearity between liquid assets to tier 1 and total regulatory capital. To 
limit the impact of multicollinearity, subsequent analysis will consider only total regulatory capital. 
Table 3 also indicates that there is a positive relationship between liquidity and profitability. This 
implies that there is a need to strike a balance between liquidity and profitability.
Notes: EQ/TA, equity to total assets; GDPG, gross domestic product growth; G.LOANS, growth of 
loans; G.TA, growth of total assets; LIQ, liquid assets to total assets; LOANS/DEP, total loans-to- 
total deposits ratio; TIER 1, Regulatory Tier 1 Capital; ROE, return on equity; T.REG.CAP, Total 
Regulatory Capital, Tier 1 plus Tier 2.
As a proxy of bank capitalisation, the ratio of Tier 1 and total regulatory capital to total risk weighted 
assets were considered. A bank could be more vulnerable when its capital is weaker compared with 
the volume of its risky assets (Martin, 1977). In this context, a bank security buffer could be too weak to 
absorb losses from bad quality assets. As shown in Table 2 , tier 1 is 16.3% and total regulatory capital 
is 17.3%. Total regulatory capital is the sum of tier 1 and tier 2. Tier 2 capital consists of capital 
instruments and subordinated loans and their associated premium accounts. The claim on the 
instrument or loan must be wholly subordinated to the claims of all non-subordinated creditors, and 
should not be secured or subject to a guarantee that enhances the seniority of its claim. As of 2017, 
under Basel III, a bank’s tier 1 and tier 2 capital must be at least 8% of its risk-weighted assets. The 
minimum capital adequacy ratio (including the capital conservation buffer) is 10.5%. The capital 
conservation buffer recommendation is designed to build up banks’ capital, which they could use in 
periods of stress. Examining the relationship between regulatory capital requirements and lending, the 
results (Table 3) indicate that there is an inverse relationship between growth in loans and both tier 1 
and total regulatory capital. This implies, when the banks are building their capital level, they are likely 
to reduce their lending. This is in line with Furfine (2000) who noted that a 1%-point increase in risk- 
based capital requirement results in a 5.5% reduction in loan growth. Similarly, Francis and Osborne 
(2009) find that a 1%-point increase in capital requirements would reduce lending in 2002 by 1.2%.
The status of the economy can play a significant role in building bank capital buffer. In terms of 
economic growth, on average, the major economies in Europe grew by 0.5% between 2008 and 
2016. Unlike Djalilov and Piesse (2019) study that demonstrated that there is a negative associa-
tion between economic growth and regulatory capital, as shown in Table 3 , there is a positive 
association between GDPG and both tier 1 and total regulatory capital. This implies that banks 
build up their capital during the economic growth. This encourages banks to strengthen their 
capital buffer. In addition, in line with Tran et al. (2016), there is a positive association between 
liquidity and capital requirements (both tier 1 and total regulatory capital). In other words, liquid 
banks are likely to meet the regulatory capital requirements.
Notes: EQ/TA, equity to total assets; GDPG, gross domestic product growth; G.LOANS, growth of 
loans; G.TA, growth of total assets; LIQ, liquid assets to total assets; LOANS/DEP, total loans-to- 
total deposits ratio; TIER 1, Regulatory Tier 1 Capital; ROE, return on equity; T.REG.CAP, Total 
Regulatory Capital, Tier 1 plus Tier 2.
As shown in Table 4, regression, the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) for the pooled fixed-effect 
s model is lower than the rest. AIC estimates the quality of each model, relative to each of the other 
models. In this case, the pooled fixed-effects model gives the best fit. However, the three models are 
reported for the purpose of comparison. The results show that ROE has positive coefficients and 
significant at 1% across all models. This implies the more profitable the bank is, the less likely to be 
cash strained. Interestingly, apart from the significance level, the magnitude of the coefficient is quite 
big. That is a 1% increase in profitability will lead to 0.295 improvements in liquidity, hence fail to 
reject hypothesis 1.
The theory of financial intermediation highlights various channels through which capital and 
liquidity are interrelated. Table 4 indicates that total regulatory capital is significant at 1%. Thus, 
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Table 1. Variable measurements
Variable Explanation Computation
Dependent variable
Liquidity ratio The buffer of liquid assets as 
a share of the balance sheet. It is 
a measure of the maturity 
structure of the asset portfolio that 
can reflect excessive maturity 
unbalances (Cihak & Poghosyan, 
2009).
Liquid assets/total assets
Liquidity ratio The loan-to-deposit ratio is used to 
assess a bank’s liquidity by 
comparing a bank’s total loans to 
its total deposits for the same 
period. It is a measure of the 
illiquidity of the asset portfolio that 
can reflect 
excessive illiquidity and higher 




Profitability Profitability of the bank as a ready 
source of liquidity (analysed in the 
regression in level)
Net profit/Total equity
Loan growth Financial constraints. Ability to 
raise new funds if loan business 
expands compared to the rest of 
the balance sheet
% of Loan growth
Economic growth The status of the economy, Gross 
Domestic Product Growth. This 
measures the macroeconomic 
conditions of the country.
GDPG
Capital adequacy Tier 1 The minimum regulatory capital 
requirement as a ratio based on 
the risk-weighted assets. (RWCR). 
Tier 1 capital includes common 
equity plus other instruments that 
are subordinated to subordinated 
debt, have no fixed maturity and 
no embedded incentive for 
redemption, and for which a bank 
can cancel dividends or coupons at 
any time (Distinguin et al., 2013).
RWCR = Capital/Risk Weighted 
assets
Total regulatory capital. This includes tier 1 and tier 2. Tier 2 
consists of unsecured 
subordinated debt and its stock 
surplus with an original maturity of 
fewer than five years minus 
investments in non-consolidated 
financial institutions subsidiaries 
under certain circumstances.
The sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 
capital.
Total Loans/Total Deposit
Growth in size of the bank Changes in the bank size using the 
log of total assets.
Growth of total assets.
Equity/total assets It represents the amount of assets 
on which shareholders have 
a residual claim.
Total shareholders’ equity/ total 
assets
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the higher is the bank’s capital ratio, the higher is its liquidity creation. In other words, higher capital 
incentivises banks to work harder, leading to more lending and liquidity creation. This is in line with 
Igan and Mirzaei (2020) who noted that banks that were liquid during the financial crisis performed 
better. Liquid banks can meet their financial intermediation role. This implies that forcing banks to 
hold a significantly higher capital not socially expensive in the long term. Better capitalised banks are 
expected to suffer fewer distortions in lending decisions and perform better confirming hypothesis 2. 
Moreover, regulatory capital positively impact profitability of banks significant at 5%. This is because 
the more capitalised the bank is, the more resources (liquid) it is and hence the more it can lend. This 
implies rejection of hypothesis 3 for the alternative. On the other hand, the high constraint bank in 
terms of capital, the less liquid it is and so less ability to lend.
Notes: LIQ, liquid assets to total assets; EQ/TA, equity to total assets; GDPG, gross domestic 
product growth; G.LOANS, growth of loans; G.TA, growth of total assets; LOANS/DEP, total loans-to- 
total deposits ratio; ROE, return on equity; T.REG.CAP, Total Regulatory Capital, Tier 1 plus Tier 2.
The results imply that higher capital requirements for banks may provide incentives for the 
bank to reduce its probability of default by monitoring their borrowers and reduce moral hazard 
by incentivising banks to invest in less risky assets. This emphasises the need not only for 
regulatory capital but also the liquidity level. A key part of the new Basel III regulation is the 
introduction of a liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) from 2015 onwards. The LCR requires banks to 
hold a sufficient level of high-quality liquid-assets against expected net liquid outflows over 
a 30-day stress period. The introduction of the LCR is seen as one of the key reforms to 
promote a more resilient banking sector. The objective is to promote the short-term resilience 
of the liquidity risk profile of banks.
Examining the impact of loans-to-deposit ratio and increase in loans on liquidity indicates 
a negative coefficient but significant at 5%. This means increased lending may have 
a detrimental impact on liquidity. That is a 1%-point increase leads to 0.035 decrease in liquidity. 
As lending is a major source of revenue, there is a need to balance profitability and liquidity.
All models also indicate the impact of bank size on liquidity. The results indicate that an increase in 
total assets leads to improved liquidity. This implies that larger banks have lower liquidity exposure. 
This is because larger banks have a better reputation and so are less exposed to liquidity risk. 
Surprisingly, although a positive coefficient, GDPG indicates that it is not significant in influencing 
liquidity. This implies an increase in liquidity in response to stronger growth appears to be only 
marginally significantly different from zero.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics
Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Observations
EQ/TA 12.300 164.000 0.014 88.220 1450
GDPG 0.527 4.089 −5.618 2.091 1450
G.LOANS 2.496 212.500 −110 16.810 1450
G.TA 4.281 68.910 −57.9 12.501 1450
LIQ 18.120 80.801 0.010 18.491 1450
LOANS/DEP 95.220 465.100 0.618 60.500 1450
TIER 1 16.301 50.100 5.950 7.200 1450
ROE 2.920 31.100 −151.82 14.120 1450
T.REG. CAP 17.325 49.561 4.714 6.900 1450
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5. Robustness check
With the introduction of the capital requirement regulation (CRR) or Basil III across Europe in 
January 2014, I check whether there is a need to divide the panel into two periods. Some of the 
new measures that Basel III introduced are aimed at preventing future crises, creating a sound 
financial system in which financial problems are not spread to the real economy. This led to the 
introduction of a mandatory capital conservation buffer of 2.5% designed to enforce corrective 
action when a bank’s capital ratio deteriorates. Then, although the minimum total
capital requirement remains at the current 8% level, yet the required total capital increases up to 
10.5% when combined with the conservation buffer. In addition, from January 2014, banks are required 
to have a discretionary countercyclical seasonal buffer up to another 2.5% of capital. Therefore, I check 
whether, such stringent measures has a significant impact on liquidity and profitability using the 
fixedeffects model from 2015 to 2019 annual data. The results are reported in Table 5. The sign of the 
coefficients remains the same as before. However, there is slight change of the magnitude of the 
coefficients of limited time frame. I also note that the significance level of regulatory capital on liquidity 
does not change. Also, the impact of liquidity on profitability does not change. That is significant at 1% as 
before. Therefore, the effect of capital ratio on credit growth is positively associated with the level of 
liquidity ratio even after the period after the implementation of CRR. Lastly, we used nonperforming loans 
as a ratio of gross loan as a proxy for credit risk (Agoraki et al., 2011) to assess the impact of liquidity and 
profitability. As shown in Table 5 , we note non-performing loans significantly impacts both the liquidity 
and profitability of the company. In other words, NPL are seen as a drain of the company’s liquidity and 
hence the need for banks to identify ways of enhancing responsibility and sustainable lending by paying 
greater attention to the needs and situations of borrowers and by finding appropriate financial products. 
This will enhance solvency and financial stability and resilience.
Notes: LIQ (Liquid assets to total assets); EQ/TA (Equity to total assets); GDPG (Gross Domestic Product 
growth); G.LOANS(Growth of Loans); G.TA (Growth of Total Assets); LOANS/DEP (Total loans to total 
deposits ratio); ROE (Return on Equity); T.REG.CAP (Total Regulatory Capital, Tier 1 plus Tier 2).
6. Conclusion and recommendations
The importance of liquid and well-functioning financial institution is undoubtably significant for the 
economic and social well-being. The study has demonstrated that there is a positive association 
between the profitability of the banks and economic growth. That is, when there is an economic 
boom, the profitability of the banks is likely to be enhanced. This is may influence the private credit 
to GDP which in turn could influence the employment level. Also, the study has shown that banks 
Table 3. Correlation matrix
EQ/TA GDPG G. 
LOANS
G.TA LIQ LOANS/ 
DEP




G.LOANS 0.012 −0.029 1
G.TA 0.018 −0.161 0.518 1
LIQ 0.016 0.002 −0.023 0.114 1
LOANS/ 
DEP
−0.019 −0.260 0.057 0.070 −0.128 1
TIER 1 0.026 0.050 −0.043 −0.053 0.198 −0.004 1
ROE 0.028 0.063 0.121 0.139 0.199 0.014 0.122 1
T.REG. 
CAP
0.022 0.049 −0.075 −0.089 0.215 0.081 0.766 0.030 1
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tend to increase the regulatory capital during the economic growth which demonstrates the 
procyclical nature of the bank capital. Therefore, banks should ensure that the quality of the 
capital base and the buffers above the regulatory minimum are built up during periods of strong 
earnings growth during economic boom so that they are available to absorb greater losses in 
stressful environments.
The results also highlight that there is a positive significant relationship between growth in total 
assets and liquidity. This implies that large banks are likely to be more liquid. In other words, as 
banks grow, there is a need for them to develop a model that maps growth and liquidity. Further, 
a 1% increase in loans grants leads to 0.144%-point decrease in liquidity. However, as banks 
generate much of their income from loans, it is an activity that cannot be avoided. Therefore, there 
is a need to strike a balance between liquidity and profitability in addition to enhance credit 
evaluation of the borrowers. This study did not consider the impact of competition of lending 
and so future studies may consider this important nexus.
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